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Abstract 
Who orders economic transactions between the criminal and legal economy? Kidnap for 
ransom raises significant governance challenges. In the absence of formal regulation and 
enforcement insurers have created an effective private governance regime to facilitate 
smooth commercial resolutions. Controlling ransoms is paramount: “supernormal” profits for 
kidnappers create kidnapping booms and undermine the market for insurance. Ransom 
control requires cooperation, but there are high transactions costs in enforcing a collusive 
agreement. Coase therefore predicts that a single firm will form to internalize the externalities 
arising from lax insurance and mismanaged ransom negotiations. Indeed, the vast majority of 
kidnap insurance is underwritten by and reinsured through Lloyd’s of London , which 
essentially functions as a club providing private governance. Within the Lloyd’s market several 
insurers compete for business, but all issue standard contracts, follow the same regime for 
kidnap resolution and exchange information to stabilize ransoms.  
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1: Introduction 
This paper studies governance at the ragged intersection between the legal and illegal 
economies: the regime ordering kidnap for ransom. Kidnapping is a major (if largely hidden) 
criminal market. Industry experts estimate that there are around 40,0001 - 100,0002 kidnaps 
and an estimated total turnover of between US$500mn3 and US$1.5bn4 a year. Ransoming 
hostages is beset with trust and enforcement problems. Kidnappers want to maximize 
ransoms and can employ extreme violence to pressurize families to reveal their assets. 
Families and law enforcement may prepare rescue operations while pretending to negotiate 
a ransom. The payment process is problematic: ransom drops can fail even if both parties act 
in good faith. Kidnappers need not release (live) hostages after payment and may demand 
multiple ransoms (Clutterbuck 1987, March 1988, Lopez 2011). Despite these considerable 
difficulties, ransoming succeeds in the vast majority of cases.  
Reliable and orderly commercial resolutions underpin the rising global demand for 
kidnap insurance (Kenney 2007/08, Fink and Pingle 2014, The Economist 2013). This paper 
argues that insurers facilitate smooth kidnap resolutions to underpin the market for kidnap 
insurance. However, it is not enough to order individual transactions on behalf of the insured. 
Premium ransom payments (while individually rational) have the potential for destabilising 
the market for kidnap for ransom insurance. This externality needs to be internalized. Cosean 
                                                             
1 Catlins 2012 
2 Agenda Week 2012  
3 Foreign Policy Centre 2001; The Economist 2013; Catlins 2012 
4 Independent, October 17, 2010  
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reasoning and club theory are used to analyse how competing insurers co-operate to provide 
effective governance in this criminal market (Coase 1960, Stringham 2015). 
Kidnap for ransom has become increasingly politicized as terrorist groups regularly 
obtain multi-million dollar ransoms from governments which nominally follow no-negotiation 
strategies (NYT 2014, United Nations 2013).  Governments have a duty to ensure the safety 
of their citizens. Yet, they must balance the human security of hostages versus broader 
security aims, which are undermined by paying large ransoms to organisations such as 
ISIL/Daesh and Al-Qaeda (White House Briefing 2015). This paper examines how private 
insurers order transactions and maintain ransom discipline in “criminal” kidnap for ransom.5 
Detailed knowledge of how private governance operates effectively across the legal / illegal 
divide is highly relevant to policy formation regarding the payment of ransoms to terrorist 
organizations (Sandler et al 2015, Wall Street Journal 2015, White House Briefing 2015). 
There is already a large literature on private and self-governance in political science 
and related disciplines. Private solutions to facilitate trade are common where government 
and law enforcement are absent or uninterested in protecting private property rights, or the 
legal process is too expensive or unsophisticated to resolve disputes (Stringham 2015, 
Williamson 1996). On the one hand, there is the study of private governance solutions for 
(broadly) legal trades and joint enterprises. Cutler et al (1999a) provides an overview of a 
wide range of private governance regimes, where experts or firms cooperate to order and 
facilitate international and online transactions. Governments can only enforce laws 
domestically and agents creating effective private governance regimes reap the gains of 
                                                             
5 For “criminal” kidnaps the ransom can be insured, whereas in “terrorist” kidnaps paying and reimbursing 
ransoms is illegal. 
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greater efficiency or market dominance (Stringham 2015). Greif (1989), Leeson (2006, 2011), 
Munger (2010) and Stringham (2015) study historical situations, where effective and 
sophisticated  institutions  incentivized co-operation long before governments began to 
regulate, legislate, adjudicate and enforce. The predominant strategy is to create a credible 
threat of excluding opportunistic and rogue traders from future transactions – or at least 
significantly reducing their profits from doing so. On the other hand, there is the literature on 
the governance of criminal markets (see Varese 2014 for a review). In the grey and illegal 
economy the protection of property rights and contract enforcement is delivered by Mafias, 
prison gangs or armed militias (e.g. Gambetta 1993, Leeson and Rogers 2009, Shortland and 
Varese 2015, Skarbek 2014, Varese 2001). Here the credible threat of violence against rogue 
traders (largely) keeps opportunism in check.  
The ordering of trades straddling the divide between the criminal and the formal 
economy has not been analysed so far. Stolen assets may be valued much more highly by the 
original owners than their criminal market value – e.g. hostages, hijacked ships and famous 
art. Trade between criminals and original owners may thus be pareto-optimal and insurers 
may have an economic interest in ordering such trades. A sophisticated insurance industry 
has developed in response to the risk of transnational kidnaps – related to the “political risk” 
insurance which underpins much of global commerce Haufler (1997, 1999).6 Risk-averse 
families, NGOs and firms employing staff in complex and hostile environments often buy 
insurance to help resolve and defray the cost of resolving criminal kidnaps (Lobo-Guerrero 
2007, Kenney 2007/08, Fink and Pingle 2014).7 Kidnap insurance is only economically viable 
                                                             
6 There is also a “local” kidnap market, which is ordered by local providers of informal governance – see for 
example Safer Yemen 2014.  
7Block and Tinsley (2008) and UN (2013) discuss why ransom payments are not usually outlawed altogether.  
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under three conditions. Firstly, kidnaps should be rare, detentions short and violence minimal 
- otherwise individuals and firms withdraw from high risk areas (Pshisva and Suarez 2010, 
Rodriguez and Villa 2012). Secondly, insurance premia must be affordable or people opt out 
of insurance. Thirdly, ransoms and kidnap volumes must be predictable and premium income 
must cover (expected) losses (Haufler 2009). If kidnapping generates supernormal profits, 
more criminals enter the kidnap business. Premium ransoms can quickly generate kidnapping 
booms (Hagedorn Auerbach 1998, Sandler et al 2015, UN 2013, Wright 2009). Insurers 
therefore have a common interest in ordering transactions and preventing ransom inflation. 
Where governance is provided privately by competing firms or agents, different 
market structures and degrees of institutionalisation have been observed (Cutler et al 1999b, 
Haufler 1999, Stringham 2015). What institutions help kidnap for ransom insurers cooperate? 
The transaction cost literature adopts a contractual approach to the study of economic 
organisations (Williamson 1989). It posits that the observed market structure arises because 
it minimizes transaction costs (Williamson 2002). Coasean reasoning applies, because there 
is a market failure at the heart of this co-ordination problem (Coase 1960, 2012): impatience 
and badly managed ransom negotiations give rise to externalities. Containing ransom 
payments is expensive: offering a high ransom can result in a faster release, reducing 
negotiation costs and risks for the hostage (Ambrus et al 2014). But high returns to kidnapping 
may trigger a kidnapping boom and ever-rising ransom demands. Unlike other insurance 
markets, kidnap insurers cannot individually establish reputations for low settlements: 
revealing their presence in negotiations raises kidnapper expectations (March 1988). 
Premium ransoms thus create externalities borne by all market participants. Insurers must 
cooperate to control prices.  
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 Although there is no “market” in ransoming – each kidnapper deals with stakeholders 
linked to a single insurer – co-operation between insurers is akin to forming a buyers’ cartel 
setting maximum prices for hostages. Indeed, “ransoming cartels” were formed to negotiate 
prisoner of war releases in the 17th and 18th centuries (Frey and Buhofer 1988).  However, in 
kidnap for ransom insurance contracts between insurers to limit ransoms would be 
unenforceable. It would be very costly to prove that a high ransom was paid because an 
insurer cut corners, leaving a cartel agreement vulnerable to “chiselling”. Coase (1960) 
predicts that the most efficient market structure is a single firm, which fully internalizes the 
externality.   
Indeed, a closer look at the market for kidnap insurance reveals that kidnap insurance 
is controlled by a single firm: Lloyd’s of London. Within Lloyd’s there are around 20 syndicates 
underwriting kidnap for ransom insurance (though their products are available through many 
more outlets). The syndicates compete for business according to clear protocols regarding 
how insurance contracts are structured, how information is (discreetly) exchanged and how 
ransom negotiations are conducted. Lloyd’s is a “private regime” in the sense of Cutler et al 
(1999b, p13): a complex set of formal and informal institutions that provides the governance 
for a specific economic issue area. As the necessary rules and protocols cannot be easily 
codified and enforced through the legal system, Lloyd’s still operates as a “club” for the 
provision of private governance (Stringham 2015). This solves the externalities problem while 
facilitating competition between insurers. Furthermore, Lloyd’s syndicates voraciously 
internalize externalities – including those arising from uninsured risks - to make kidnap for 
ransom insurable. It is a perfect example of the way in which externalities and transactions 
costs shape the institutions which make up the economic system (Coase 2012 p13).  
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 The paper also contributes to the literature on the insurability of risks. Fink and Pingle 
(2014) and Kenney (2007/08) examine the decision to buy kidnap insurance, but not how 
insurers can profitably supply it. Haufler (1997, 1999) and Cutler et al (1999b) point to the 
role of underwriters in setting standards for what can and cannot be insured. Avant and 
Haufler (2012 p20) draw attention to the plethora of private security companies and risk 
analysts which offer risk mitigation services. Lobo-Guerrero (2007) discusses the security 
audits required to make kidnap risks insurable. To the best of my knowledge nobody has 
studied how multiple insurers collaborate to stabilize kidnaps and ransoms at a level where 
kidnapping is profitable to insure.  
Specialty insurance and kidnap resolution are by necessity discreet operations. If firms 
or individuals are known to have insurance, moral hazard problems arise, kidnappers might 
target insured individuals specifically and their ransoms expectations escalate (March 1988, 
Ochoa 2012). Specialty insurance is mostly “bespoke”: prices vary according to who is insured, 
for what purposes, the number of people exposed to risk, the risk environment, risk 
mitigation measures, previous incidents etc (Lobo-Guerrero 2007, Merkling and Davis 2001).  
This secrecy makes it infeasible to collect representative, quantitative data on who buys 
insurance from whom and at what price. Most of the evidence presented below is open 
source information from insurance companies and the Lloyd’s corporation. Some ransom 
data were provided by the business risk consultancy Control Risks. In addition I conducted 
sixteen in-depth interviews of 1-3 hours with employees of different crisis response 
companies, victims, insurers and lawyers involved in kidnap resolution – see appendix A for 
details. Several individuals agreed to be re-interviewed or provided additional information by 
e-mail as the project took shape, allowing me to cross-check information and confirm the 
8 
 
validity of my findings. As most informants chose to remain anonymous I used secondary 
open source information from the insurance sector, crisis response companies, governments, 
NGOs, memoirs of ransom negotiators and newspaper articles to cross-reference the 
interview information where possible.  
 
2. Ransom discipline  
Contrary to general perceptions based on newspaper headlines, most commercially resolved 
kidnap cases conclude relatively cheaply and quickly. Catlins – a major underwriter of kidnap 
risks - reports that “In land-based kidnapping… the ransom amounts are comparatively 
small... Most demands are in the thousands or tens of thousands of dollars. Only a few cross 
the six-figure threshold, and still fewer exceed US$1 million.” (Catlins 2012, p2)  Data from the 
business risk consultancy Control Risks corroborate this assessment.8 Control Risks was 
involved in resolving more than 200 Nigerian kidnap cases in 2006-2014. The median duration 
was 5 days and 75% of cases were resolved within 10 days.9 Only one victim was detained for 
more than 50 days. Although these cases were resolved by Control Risks – suggesting that the 
targets were valuable – the median ransom per person was less than $5,500 and 75% of cases 
were resolved for $12,800 per person or less. Even for cases involving foreign nationals the 
75th percentile is below $100,000. Victim stakeholders – likely to include major oil 
                                                             
8 Control Risks is retained by Hiscox, the world’s largest underwriter of kidnap risks with a market share in of 
60-70% by premium income in 2011. 
http://www.hiscox.co.uk/_html_emails/group/kidnap_ransom/docs/monthly_kidnap_news_0811.pdf  
9 Oceans Beyond Piracy (2012, p16) reported average detention periods of around 4 days for piratical kidnap 
cases in the Niger Delta.   
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companies10 - never paid close to US$1million. In Mexico (with a GDP per capita roughly three 
times that of Nigeria), Control Risks reports higher ransoms for more than a hundred kidnap 
cases between 2008 and 2014: the median ransom was $37,565 and the 75th percentile at 
$137,700. The median duration was 3 days and 75% of cases were resolved within 5 days. Just 
two cases settled for more than $1 million.  
Managing and containing the expectations of kidnappers is essential. Kidnap 
insurance needs to be reasonably priced and detentions short. If kidnappers’ ransom 
expectations are stable and affordable, negotiations converge rapidly and insurance works 
well. Ransoms are negotiated under asymmetric information: kidnappers do not know who 
pays the ransom (family, firm, insurer or government) – or the financial position of each of 
these entities. This is very different from the efficient plunder contracts observed by Leeson 
and Nowrasteh (2011), where the approximate market value of ships and cargoes was 
common knowledge.11 In the absence of detailed information, kidnappers appear to base 
their ransom expectations for specific “victim types” on easily verifiable characteristics and 
past ransoms for that “type”.12 Interviews with professional ransom negotiators and victim 
stakeholders indicate that for most negotiations the “target settlement price” and 
negotiation duration are fairly clear from the outset (Interviews IV, V, X, XI, XIII, XIV, March 
1988).  
                                                             
10 Shell, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Total and Eni account for 90% of total Nigerian crude output. Petroleum Review 
(2013)  
11 Rich, well-known families often pay high ransoms very quickly, as their financial position is known to the 
kidnappers. This does not necessarily affect ransoms for other victims.  
12 In Frey and Buhofer (1988) ransoms were negotiated according to soldiers’ (easily observable) rank. Somali  
pirates priced according to ship type, size, flag state, crew numbers and nationalities (World Bank 2013). 
10 
 
However, if kidnappers receive an outlier ransom, concurrent and future victims of 
that type are also tested at the new price (Interviews II, IV and V). News of large, easy ransoms 
– i.e. supernormal profits – quickly spread through criminal communities. New gangs enter 
the market modelling their expectations on previously realized ransoms.  A badly conducted 
ransom negotiation is therefore not just problematic for the insurer who reimburses the 
inflated ransom, but for the wider industry. 
A good illustration of a badly governed kidnap market is the evolution of hijack 
frequency and ransoms in Somalia (Figure 1). Initially, few ships had hijack-for-ransom 
insurance. Therefore, some ransoms were negotiated by myopic or inexperienced negotiators 
(including governments), who occasionally agreed record ransoms. These ransoms revealed 
valuable information about what Western ship owners would pay to retrieve their ships and 
crew. This led to a collapse of price discipline and the explosion of piracy.  
- Insert Figure 1 here  - 
Somali pirates directly referred to a “market price” in their negotiations - meaning the 
price for recently released comparable ships. If news of a premium ransom arrived, this was 
included in ongoing and subsequent negotiations as the new “market price” (Interviews II, V, 
X, XI). As one pirate communicator13 explained to his counterparty:  
“There are some ships like [name withheld], they went back, they are at 1.5 
[million US$] now 1.7, and then 4 or 5 days ago another third ship got 1.8. Those are 
the kind of stuff they are looking at, so what I am saying is… it’s my opinion because 
                                                             
13 Usually both sides nominate “communicators” to relay information between decision-makers. 
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these people they just like children you know. If you got that candy they want to have 
the same candy.”14  
Ship-owners who resisted the new “market price” had their ships held for several 
further months (and sometimes years) to test their resolve. Ship-owners rarely managed to 
barter pirates down from their new target (Interview VI). Instead, they generally accepted the 
previous comparable settlement as the new reference value. As one ship-owner explained to 
the pirate communicator: “… We can’t go above the current market”.  “The [name withheld] 
is very similar to our ship. Ok, so ah, why do we have to go through this nonsense when they 
know the [name withheld] was done at 1.7? Why do I have to waste my time at 1.9?”15 
Econometrically, the best predictor of ransoms was the previous highest ransom paid for a 
particular ship type (De Groot et al 2012).   
Premium ransoms can even influence cases in other geographic areas. NYT (2014) 
suggests that Al Qaida developed a common kidnapping protocol for the Islamic Maghreb, 
the Arabian Peninsula and Somalia and that while “….in 2003 the kidnappers received around 
$200,000 per hostage, now they are netting up to $10 million”. Each case therefore has the 
potential of creating significant spill-overs: there is an externality in overpaying kidnappers. 
On one level, this is a simple “pecuniary externality”, where an agent’s transaction changes 
prices for unrelated third parties. Mostly pecuniary externalities do not produce social costs, 
but transfer surplus between the counterparties of subsequent trades (Holcombe and Sobel 
2001). However, in this case there is a social cost: the “products” in question are hostages – 
some of whom die in the “production process” - the “producers” are criminals and the “trade” 
                                                             
14 FBI transcript of CEC Future ransom negotiation: hijacked 7 October 2008, released 15 January 2009  
15 FBI transcript of CEC Future 
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is a forced transaction. If criminals under-price their “product”, it would be hard to make an 
economic efficiency argument to reveal that information. Any new equilibrium involves 
higher transfers to criminals and consequently higher crime rates.  
Moreover, if ransoms and kidnaps escalate insurance markets can collapse, imposing 
further social costs. As insurance premia rise, some potential victims will be priced out of 
buying insurance or only insure partially (Haufler 2009).16  If stakeholders are unable to afford 
the kidnappers’ target ransom, they have to wait until the kidnappers adjust their 
expectations downwards (or come under external pressure to release). 17 Ambrus et al (2014 
p2) argue that poor stakeholders signal their low valuation of the hostage by being patient – 
even when faced with physical violence to the hostage (e.g. NYT 1998). This signal would not 
be emulated by rich stakeholders. If everyone pays their reservation price, negotiations drag 
on as kidnappers probe stakeholders’ valuation of the hostage  – with threats and actual 
violence.    
In such cases people change their behaviour. Rather than insuring their usual activities 
for a rapidly rising insurance premium, they avoid the high risk area and disinvest (Pshisva 
and Suarez 2010), generating further economic inefficiencies and costs. Merkling and Davis 
(2001) report several insurers withdrawing from insuring kidnaps in Colombia at the height of 
the kidnapping boom. Ransom inflation and extreme detention periods also ended piracy in 
Somalia.18 Most insurers incurred heavy losses on their hijack for ransom policies and some 
withdrew from underwriting these risks (House of Commons 2012 Ev3). The remainder 
                                                             
16 The Guardian 2014 discusses recent developments in kidnap insurance premia. 
17 In Fink and Pingle’s (2014) model the kidnappers simply kill poorer hostages– in practice murder is rare.  
18 The last merchant vessel was taken in May 2012. 
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lobbied for naval protection and compelled ship-owners to adopt best management practice 
and employ private security guards (Shortland 2015). However, the cost of containment vastly 
exceeds the pre-2008 cost of insuring ships and resolving the very occasional hijack for much 
less than US$1mn.19 Managing externalities is therefore crucial for kidnap for ransom insurers 
– and highly desirable from a public policy point of view.   
 
3. Internalising Externalities  
Containing ransoms requires potentially lengthy bargaining with kidnappers while 
managing relations with the media, police and relevant victim stakeholders. The process is 
usually led by a crisis management team of senior executives with the support of specialist 
consultants. Bargaining generally involves threats of violence and offers and demands may 
converge quite slowly - occasionally over periods of weeks and months (Clutterbuck 1987, 
Lopez 2011, March 1988). Given the high financial and psychological costs of negotiating, 
there is a temptation for hostage stakeholders to settle early and expensively. Insurers which 
regularly reimburse (falsely or negligently) inflated claims have to charge higher premia and 
eventually price themselves out of business. Normally, other insurers can take a tough line on 
inflated claims and hence remain unaffected by their competitors’ mistakes. However, in 
kidnap cases the knowledge that victims are insured raises kidnappers’ ransom expectations. 
The insurers therefore do not reveal themselves in the negotiation.20 Insurers taking a 
                                                             
19 The cost of Somali piracy in 2013 was estimated at $3-3.2bn with around $2bn spent on military operations 
and on-board security teams. http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/attachments/SoP2013-
2PagerDigital_0.pdf  
20 Firms invalidate their insurance cover if they tell employees that they are insured (Lobo-Guerrero 2007).   
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“tough” stance on ransoms would not be credible either. Kidnappers could blackmail insurers 
with violence and damaging media exposure – inviting litigation by hostage stakeholders.21 
Insurers cannot therefore unilaterally prevent spill-overs.  
An alternative would be for insurers to formally collude – i.e. form a buyers’ cartel to 
control ransoms. A buyers’ cartel aims to act as a monopsonist, extracting seller surplus. In 
kidnap for ransom there is no “market” for hostages: victims buy insurance before the kidnap, 
so just one insurer is involved in each transaction.22 However, the existence of the pecuniary 
externality motivates the formation of a “cartel”. Can insurers enforce a cartel agreement to 
internalize the externality? Coase (1960) argued that externalities are managed efficiently by 
the market if property rights are clearly assigned. If transaction costs are zero, it does not 
matter which party holds the property right: either the party which is harmed can pay the 
producer of the externality to desist from or reduce the harmful activity, or the producer 
compensates those harmed by its activities (Allen 2002 p5). However, if one wanted to 
contract over ransoms, transactions costs would be high. Firstly, the insurer does not “own” 
the hostages.23 The negotiation is conducted by the insured’s family or firm: all decisions are 
made by the victim stakeholders in the perceived best interest of the victim. The insurer can 
only limit the amount of insurance cover and act in an advisory capacity. 
Secondly, there are high information costs in verifying whether a “premium” ransom 
was paid. Allen (2002 p14) points out that acquiring information is costly when outcomes are 
both variable (by nature) and alterable (by man). Ransoms are highly variable (see figure 2). 
                                                             
21 See for example the political fallout from the ISIL beheadings (Wall Street Journal 2015). 
22 Large contracts are sometimes underwritten by several syndicates, but there is  a lead syndicate.   
23 Unlike Frey and Buhofer’s government-led ransom cartels in the 17th and 18th century. 
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Ransoms depend on the victim’s financial position, the negotiating stakeholders’ patience and 
personality and the sophistication and expectations of the kidnapping gang. But ransoms also 
depend on the effort of the insurer to steer the negotiation towards the appropriate 
settlement for the victim type and prevent an early, higher than desirable conclusion.  
- Insert Figure 2 here - 
If an outcome is both variable and alterable, cheating can occur without detection. 
Insurer “effort” in the ransom negotiation is not observable without full access to all aspects 
of the negotiation and briefings - plus detailed information on the victim’s financial position 
and the kidnappers’ sophistication. Kidnap victims would resist making this material public. 
Contracting between insurers is therefore neither enforceable nor self-enforcing  (Williamson 
2002). Myopic insurers could cut short ransom negotiations to save themselves time, hassle 
and cost and reimburse high ransoms without punishment.  
As transactions costs are high, we must look for the most efficient assignment of the 
property right which confers externalities on others: underwriting the insurance 
contract. Coase (1960 p16/17) predicted that in the presence of high transactions costs the 
externality will be completely internalized by one firm owning all the activities that have 
external effects on each other. The most efficient market structure from a transactions cost 
economics point of view is therefore that one insurer "owns" all the kidnap risk (Williamson 
2002). 
H1: The most efficient market structure is a single firm selling kidnap for ransom 
insurance.  
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We should also observe that the firm is concerned about externalities arising from 
uninsured risks. It is in the interest of the insurer to insure cash-rich firms and families or 
otherwise prevent premium ransom payments by inexperienced or myopic negotiators.   
H2: Companies and families which might confer externalities are incentivized to buy 
kidnap insurance or use professional risk mitigation and kidnap solutions. 
Occasionally, people without insurance are kidnapped. Without advice about true 
local ransom expectations and faced with the threat of violence to their loved one, 
stakeholders might well offer their true reservation price to kidnappers. This could change 
kidnappers’ expectations and thereby confer externalities on kidnap insurers and future 
victims. One would therefore expect insurers to provide advice on a “pro bono” basis – though 
the family will still have to pay the ransom.24  
H3: Insurers will provide free advice on uninsured cases which could confer 
externalities on the sector.  
 
4. Evidence 
4.1. “A single enterprise orders the market” 
Prima facie the evidence for Coase is weak: the kidnap insurance market appears 
highly competitive. A large number of insurance companies, boutique insurers and brokers 
                                                             
24 Not every uninsured person is offered pro bono advice, which is also perceived to be inferior to the 
“insured” service (Interview XV, March 1988). This reduces the incentive to free-ride.  
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sell kidnap insurance. But on closer inspection, the risk is borne by a much smaller number of 
“specialty risk” insurance companies. When large insurance companies actively market 
kidnap insurance, they usually do not offer an “in-house” product, but sell products from 
specialist insurers.25 For example, both Zurich and Schinnerer sell Hiscox insurance.26 
Several major insurers do not advertise kidnap insurance at all (e.g. Allianz), but as a 
“one stop shop” will provide cover for their corporate and high net worth clients. Usually this 
is arranged through a broker, as general insurers do not have the necessary information to 
price a kidnap for ransom product correctly. If they do issue kidnap insurance – e.g. one might 
include “free” kidnap cover in a bigger insurance package - they usually reinsure 60-90% of 
the risks, rather than keeping this concentrated risk on their books (Interview XIV, XVI). Lloyd’s 
is a major reinsurance market: any significant business written on a direct insurance basis has 
a reasonable chance of being reinsured or retroceded back into the Lloyd’s Market (Interview 
XVI). This is especially the case for “specialist” kidnap insurance. Although the London market 
is only the fourth largest reinsurance market in the world, it is “the leading market for 
companies that need[..] (re)insurance coverage for large, complex or bespoke risks.” (London 
Market Group 2014 p8).  As reinsurers, Lloyds specialty insurers take on the role of co-
ordination services firms, setting standards for how this type of risk is insured (Cutler et al 
1999b, Haufler 1999).  
                                                             
25 E.g. Aon sells kidnap insurance “from a wide range of insurers for the broadest choice of price, coverage and 
response consultants” http://www.aon.com/risk-services/crisis-management/kidnap-ransom.jsp  
26http://www.zurichna.com/internet/zna/SiteCollectionDocuments/en/Products/directorsandofficers/MSG%2
0Kidnap%20and%20Ransom%20FS.pdf and https://www.schinnerer.com/industries/kidnap-
ransom/Documents/KandR-Advantages.pdf  accessed May 2015 
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The setting of standards still requires coordination between the specialty insurers. The 
interviewees in this project named all the kidnap insurers they had ever used, worked for or 
had knowledge of.27 Table 1 alphabetically lists the insurers mentioned.28 The large majority 
of kidnap insurance policies are underwritten by Hiscox, AIG, Chubb, Travelers, XL/Catlin and 
Houston Casualty. The others are relatively minor players (Interview XIII).  
All the insurers and brokers state on their websites who underwrites their kidnap 
insurance contracts. In all but one case, the companies referred either to Lloyd’s generally or 
to a specific syndicate (or syndicates) within Lloyd’s, where each syndicate is known by a 
unique number. Where the information was not precise I used the list published by the Bank 
of England of Lloyd’s managing agents and syndicates to check how exactly the insurers were 
linked to Lloyd’s. The list from 01 January 201529 showed that – with one exception discussed 
in detail below - kidnapping risks are either underwritten by specific Lloyd’s syndicates, or are 
likely to be placed in the Lloyd’s market through Lloyd’s brokers.    
The exception to the rule appeared to be American International Group – named 
above as a major underwriter by industry insiders. AIG does not advertise or mention a Lloyd’s 
connection on its website and no Lloyd’s syndicate is registered with the AIG brand name. 
However, the annual statement of syndicate 1414 “Ascot Underwriting Limited” states:  
                                                             
27 There are additional brokers of kidnap insurance (e.g. A J Gallagher), but they sell unmodified cover from 
specialized insurers. 
28 The market is fluid with occasional mergers, entries and exits. The table reflects the status quo in July 2015. 
29 2015 list available through Google. The previous year’s list has the following web address 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/pra/Documents/authorisations/syndicateslist1401.pdf  
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“The only related parties that have transacted with Syndicate 1414 are companies 
within the AIG group of companies.” (p21) and “The ultimate parent company and 
controlling party of the Syndicate’s main corporate member, ACNL, is American 
International Group Inc. (“AIG”) ...” (p22).30  
There are no kidnap insurance products marketed directly by Ascot. AIG clearly does 
not value the Lloyd’s brand and yet underwrites insurance at Lloyd’s via Ascot. Coase’s 
explanation would be that as an outsider AIG would not be trusted to internalize the 
externalities. By incurring the considerable cost of maintaining a syndicate at Lloyd’s, AIG 
signals that it is invested in kidnap insurance in the long term.31 This is analogous to patient 
traders in informal economies making valuable gifts to local chieftains to distinguish 
themselves from opportunistic traders (Leeson 2006). In addition, as an insider AIG is able to 
access relevant case information. There is therefore clear evidence in favour of Coase’s 
prediction of a “single firm” solution to the externalities problem in kidnap for ransom 
insurance. How do they collaborate to control ransom inflation?  
4.1.2. Insurance at Lloyd’s  
Lloyd’s (formerly Lloyd’s of London) is not an insurance company per se, but a market. 
Lloyd’s members (individual “Names”, limited partnerships or corporations) can join together 
as a syndicate and provide the capital supporting the syndicate’s underwriting business. 
Legally, the membership in a syndicate lasts only for one year at a time. Most syndicates’ core 
                                                             
30 
https://www.Lloyd’s.com/~/media/files/Lloyd’s/investor%20relations/syndicate%20reports%20and%20accou
nts/2013/1414a.pdf  
31 See Economist 2004 on the cost of joining Lloyd’s. 
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capital is provided by the same members for many years and syndicates function as 
permanent insurance operations.32 Transactions are conducted face-to-face in the 
Underwriting Room between the underwriters and the Lloyd’s Brokers.33 The brokers are 
highly specialized in particular areas of risk. They negotiate competitive terms for their clients 
within the market, with different syndicates competing for business. 
- Insert Figure 3 here  - 
Figure 3 shows the lay-out of “underwriting boxes” in the ground floor of the Lloyd’s 
building in Lime Street.34 The “boxes” are desks shared by 4-8 specialist underwriters, who 
are approached by brokers for quotes regarding particular risk exposures. Most syndicates 
offering kidnap insurance are located in this area, with the exception of Houston Casualty on 
Gallery 1, Aspen on Gallery 2 and CV Starr and Chubb on Gallery 3.35 Each syndicate has one 
or two kidnap specialists, who develop great expertise and occasionally move between 
companies (Interview XVI). 
In this small community information can flow without compromising client 
confidentiality. The Economist (2004) cites Mr Hiscox of the eponymous underwriting 
business about the Lloyd’s market: “…we all see each other's risks… It's wonderfully gossipy.” 
Underwriters discuss ransoms paid, negotiation durations and the performance of crisis 
                                                             
32 https://www.Lloyd’s.com/Lloyd’s/about-us/what-is-Lloyd’s  
33 The Lloyd’s market can also be accessed through “coverholders”, who are authorized to enter into insurance 
contracts on behalf of a syndicate. 
34 The major underwriters are highlighted. Beazley, QBE Marine, ACE, Canopius, Ironshore (Pembroke) and 
Liberty are also in the room. XL and Catlin merged since publication of the guide and their boxes were labelled 
XL/Catlin in June 2015. 
35 New syndicates are given a desk where one becomes available (Interview V).  
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response consultants “over lunch” (Interview V). This information flow is crucial to the 
functioning of the market. To price their product and conduct efficient ransom negotiations 
insurers need information of relevant past cases. However, most kidnaps are resolved very 
discreetly. Families and firms rarely wish to advertise how much they paid a kidnapper - even 
if there are no legal issues surrounding abetting crime by paying a ransom.36 Open source 
information is therefore scant and unreliable.37 Significant under-reporting of cases is the 
norm and where ransoms are released the information is often contradictory. The availability 
of information within Lloyd’s and the high cost of acquiring it outside creates a significant 
barrier to entry into the market.38  
The Lloyd’s corporation sets the framework and rules under which the syndicates 
compete – it is a “private regime”. Although independent, all syndicates operate according to 
Lloyd’s by-laws. The Corporation of Lloyd’s oversees and governs the market and sets the 
required capital levels for its members. It also sets commercial standards to ensure that 
“underwriters operate in a way that benefits the whole market.”39 The Corporation holds the 
syndicates’ assets and members’ funds in trust, so they are available to cover the insured 
risks. To cover catastrophic losses exceeding the funds of individual syndicates there is the 
                                                             
36 Some countries attempted to outlaw ransom payments – see Block and Tinsley 2008.  
37 The Guardian 2014 
38 This does not mean that it is never attempted. The House of Commons Select Committee (2012 Ev3) shows 
that boutique insurers attempted to enter the Somali hijack for ransom insurance business. However, they 
found it unprofitable and had stopped providing coverage by 2011. Headhunting key staff may be another way 
to get the necessary information. In 2012 an Australian insurer employed the former global manager of kidnap 
insurance from Chartis (AIG)  to head its (tiny) kidnap for ransom division. However, updating information 
without a Lloyd’s connection would be difficult and it is likely that the products are reinsured at Lloyd’s. 
https://www.acchealth.com.au/product_special_risks.do 
39 HMRC Introduction to Lloyd’s  http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/llmanual/LLM1010.htm 
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“Central Fund” – consisting of mutual assets held by the Corporation and the ability to call on 
all members to make additional subscriptions if needed. This fund can be used to meet any 
member’s insurance liabilities. Lloyd’s strong international credit rating – often referenced by 
the insurers - is based on this “Chain of Security”.40   
Syndicates trading under the Lloyd’s brand therefore benefit from and contribute to 
Lloyd’s central resources. The Lloyd’s brand and its credit rating are extremely valuable – 
especially to the smaller insurers. In return, syndicates operate under the Council’s watchful 
eye: “… the Corporation reviews and agrees business plans, monitors compliance against 
Lloyd’s minimum standards and monitors syndicates’ performance … Lloyd’s can take a range 
of actions, including, as a last resort, requiring a syndicate to cease underwriting.” 41  
The wording here (and elsewhere) seems surprisingly vague: what exactly is a 
transgression against “minimum standards”? The lack of strict criteria is the very strength of 
Lloyd’s, which effectively still operates as a “private club” (Stringham 2015). Under its by-laws 
Lloyd’s can exclude syndicates which destabilize the market without hard evidence of 
malpractice. Club membership has a high value in terms of access to crucial information and 
the financial guarantee. Members are unlikely to risk this in pursuit of short-term profits. 
Indeed, in practice the “Corporation” usually only intervenes in the “Market” to provide 
guidance and information (Interview XVI).  The Lloyd’s set-up of “Corporation” and “Market” 
therefore enables both cooperation (to control ransoms) and competition (for business). So 
what are the (implicit) rules of “good practice” in kidnap for ransom insurance? 
                                                             
40 Lloyd’s Annual Report 2011   
41 Lloyd’s Annual Report 2011 p8 
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4.1.3. The Lloyd’s “regime” for kidnap insurance and resolution 
Kidnap insurance is usually “bespoke”: the insurance premium depends on the risk 
exposure and the mitigation practices adopted by the company or family (Lobo-Guerrero 
2007). Part of the insurance premium is used for security briefings, staff training and security 
checks on premises (Business Insurance 2008). The insurance contracts are extremely similar 
in the coverage they provide and in their approach to resolving incidents (Marsh 2011, 
Interviews III, IV, V).42 The maximum ransom which can be insured is limited to what the client 
(corporate or family) can raise themselves. The ransom is reimbursed after payment and the 
insurance contract cannot be used as collateral – meaning the victim stakeholders actually 
have to raise the ransom themselves initially. Employers are not allowed to discuss the 
insurance with their employees – doing so will invalidate the insurance cover.43 All these 
stipulations serve to reduce moral hazard among the insured.  
In the event of a kidnap, the insurance contracts provide unlimited (free) access to a 
crisis response company.44 Experienced crisis response consultants usually arrive within 24 
hours of the kidnap to advise stakeholders. They convey information about the kidnapping 
gang’s previous conduct (including advice on whether to involve the local police) and to 
inform stakeholders of the target settlement price and expected ransom duration. They 
reassure stakeholders during threats and advise them on their negotiation strategy (Hiscox 
2014, p19, Financial Times 2011). Moral suasion is used to avoid early premium settlements 
by cash-rich victim stakeholders, alerting them to their responsibilities vis-à-vis future victims 
                                                             
42 This was confirmed by studying sample contracts and promotional material on the websites of various 
kidnap for ransom insurers. 
43 “K&R policies include a requirement that they are kept confidential.” Marsh 2011 p5 
44 See table 1 for the crisis responders used by each insurer. Also see Marsh 2011  
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and the risk of a “revised” demand if too much is offered too quickly (Interviews V, X, XI, 
March 1988). Consultants remain assigned to the case until is resolved or the victim is proven 
dead (Interview IV, Hiscox 2014, p19).  
Although the consultants are ultimately paid by the insurer, this is an arm’s length 
relationship: the consultants are not instructed how to handle individual cases or when to 
terminate them. Instead, crisis consultants operate in a highly competitive environment, with 
different consultancies seeking to be the “named” responder on particular policies (Interview 
V). Only the biggest kidnap insurers retain full time consultants, the rest are employed on a 
case-by-case basis (Interview IV, V, VI).45 Consultants build reputations for good settlements 
and expertise in particular areas. Knowledge of “botched” negotiations quickly  spread in the 
community of insurers and response companies.  
Taken together, the Lloyd’s system looks very much like Coase’s alternative solution 
to the externalities problem with high transaction costs: a government, which “…may impose 
regulations which state what people must or must not do and which have to be obeyed… 
decree that certain methods of production should or should not be used…” (Coase 1960 p17). 
However, in this case the threat is not “else you will go to jail” or a large fine: the ultimate 
sanction is to lose the benefits of club membership (Stringham 2015).  
 
5. Voracious Internalising 
                                                             
45 Tokio Marine is an exception, its “in-house” kidnap division appears to be a loss-leader (Interview XII). 
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Firms and families who are not properly advised may well pay outlier ransoms. As 
insurers do not reveal themselves in insured cases, any premium ransom has the potential of 
raising kidnapper expectations. There is therefore a strong incentive to internalize 
externalities from uninsured cases as well.  
5.1. Preventing spill-overs from self-insurance 
For many companies paying even a significant one-off ransom is not problematic. One 
interviewee quoted a customer in the oil sector faced with a million dollar ransom demand: 
“Why don’t we just give them a million dollars? We spill more than that in a day...” (Interview 
IV). Yet, according to The Guardian (2014) “… at least 75% of Fortune 500 companies hold K&R 
insurance policies...” Why do these companies insure kidnap risks? 
Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that insurers have a comparative advantage in 
providing services related to claims management and in monitoring compliance with risk 
mitigation guidelines. Indeed, kidnap insurers foreground the specialist services of crisis 
response companies in risk mitigation, negotiating and delivering ransoms. They also insure 
employers for legal liability arising from kidnap cases (Business Insurance Online 2012). 
Corporations fear litigation unless they have demonstrably followed “best practice”. Kidnap 
specialists use part of the insurance premium to provide training and security advice for the 
companies’ staff and security checks of the premises of their overseas operations (Business 
Insurance 2008). Thereby, companies cannot be accused of not trying to prevent abductions 
in the first place. If a kidnap occurs, the insurer’s experienced crisis consultants reduce the 
likelihood of a bad outcome (Merkling and Davis 2001) and the probability of an employer 
being found negligent. Kidnap insurance is therefore attractive even to companies which 
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could theoretically self-insure. Major companies which do self-insure have direct contracts 
with the risk consultancies to prevent and resolve kidnap cases.46 
Voracious internalising is also likely to be behind the inclusion of kidnap cover in the 
“Gap Year Insurance” sold by Hiscox.47 This prevents well-off families from self-negotiating 
and inadvertently changing kidnapper expectations. Because the insured party knows that 
insurance was purchased, a low ransom limit is used to reduce moral hazard. Effectively it is 
a “claims only” contract of the type described by Mayers and Smith (1982 p285), where the 
insurer provides the claims management services, but the insured pays the claim.  
5.2. “pro bono services to promote market stability”  
Sometimes uninsured people are taken hostage. If the incident can create spill-overs, 
it is in the interest of kidnap insurers to control these negotiations. Two illustrative cases are 
the snatching of Judith Tebbutt from a Kenyan beach resort and the hijack of the Chandler 
couple from their private yacht by Somali pirates. Had these kidnaps been profitable they 
might have broadened the targets of Somali pirates from commercial shipping. The families 
were therefore offered pro bono expert advice and coached in how to conduct the 
negotiation.48  
The cost of staging the Chandler kidnap and the extended negotiation period were 
considerable. World Bank (2013) estimated the start-up cost of a piracy team at just below 
US$80,000, on which investors would expect a financial return in the region of 430%. NYT 
                                                             
46 E.g. the international oil giant case study on the Olive Group website.  
http://www.olivegroup.com/cst_details.php?cstid=3  
47 http://www.hiscox.co.uk/travel/gap-travel-insurance/details-of-cover/  
48 House of Commons 2012 Ev 71 
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(2011) reports an estimated cost of US$20,000 a month in food and guards’ wages. The 388 
day negotiation would have cost around $250,000. A host of local power-brokers expected 
protection money (Shortland and Varese 2014). Yet, the House of Commons (2012) reports a 
final ransom of just US$440,000, meaning that the Chandler kidnap resulted in a large number 
of disappointed investors, pirates, guards, local suppliers and protectors. The case of Judith 
Tebbutt appears to have been resolved on a similar basis (The Guardian 2012).  
Although pro bono advice is presented as being given on humanitarian grounds, the 
approach in cases with clear scope for considerable externalities contrasts sharply with that 
of the “forgotten mariners” in Somalia. Here the victims are from poor countries, the ship-
owners have abandoned them and their families have nothing substantial to offer. There is 
no business case for helping them and indeed commercial involvement in these cases is 
limited (The Telegraph 26 March 2015).  
 
6. Conclusions 
The market for kidnap insurance is characterized by externalities: cash-rich victim 
stakeholders can increase kidnappers’ ransom expectations and encourage new kidnappings. 
Insurers need to prevent quick payments of premium ransoms, but can only do so at a cost. 
The private short-term benefits from containing ransoms are less than the benefits to the 
sector as a whole – myopic stakeholders are tempted to cut corners. For the market to be 
stable and risks to be calculable, this externality needs to be managed. Given the impossibility 
of enforcing “proper” ransom negotiations through contracts due to high transaction costs, 
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Coase would predict a single supplier of kidnap insurance. On the other hand, customers 
expect choice and competition when buying insurance.  
The Lloyd’s solution is therefore an ingenious answer to the problems presented by 
kidnap insurance. By setting clear parameters for commercial resolution Lloyd’s enables “fair” 
competition between different providers and avoids kidnap insurance being sold 
monopolistically. There is a protocol for insuring and resolving kidnaps. Its use is mandatory 
and it (largely) prevents individual insurers from conferring externalities to the rest of the 
sector. The insurance market works smoothly because Lloyd’s enables relevant case 
information to flow easily between insurers without compromising client confidentiality. 
Underwriters’ desks are staffed by a few individuals who constantly interact with each other. 
Individual underwriters would be ostracized if they did not pass (truthful) information to the 
Lloyd’s insurance community or spread it beyond its confines.  
Kidnap insurance is therefore a perfect example of the way in which externalities and 
transactions costs shape the institutions which make up the economic system (Coase 2012 
p13, Williamson 2002). The analysis also contributes to the literature which points out the 
elegance and ingenuity of (informal) private solutions to seemingly intractable governance 
problems (Munger 2010). As a “single firm” Lloyd’s internalizes externalities, but it also 
preserves a reasonably competitive market for kidnap insurance by imposing certain rules on 
its members. Because Lloyd’s is in essence a private members club, its threat of closing down 
“rogue” syndicates is credible – there is no legal redress if a syndicate is closed (Stringham 
2015). This allows Lloyd’s to act like a government vis-à-vis its members, regulating the 
methods of production. This perfectly satisfies the “transaction cost economics” school of 
thought (Williamson 2002): Lloyd’s minimizes transaction costs by setting and enforcing 
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desirable rules for the market to function without recourse to costly legal appeals. Lloyd’s role 
as a “private regime” in international private governance therefore has a clear basis in Cosean 
economics (Cutler et al 1999b). 
There is an important policy implication of this analysis. Governments which intervene 
on behalf of kidnapped citizens regularly pay premium ransoms (NYT 2014). Unlike the 
participants in the private governance regime of kidnap for ransom, governments often act 
myopically and under media pressure. They have neither binding budget constraints nor a 
profit motive to contain ransoms. There is no mechanism to internalize the spill-overs of 
government settlements on other negotiations. Paying multi-million dollar ransoms solves 
political problems in the short term but confers significant externalities on current and future 
kidnap victims, their governments and the insurance sector. Ransom inflation in the private 
sector has been contained by increased patience on the side of private negotiators, spending 
additional weeks and months convincing kidnappers that private ransoms will not be 
comparable to government-funded ransoms. However, given the inexorable rise of ransoms 
in the government-negotiated sector and their worrying implications for terrorist financing, 
one should consider whether employing private sector solutions would not achieve the same 
end (“the timely and safe return of the hostages.”49) more reliably and at a fraction of the 
price. 
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Figure 1: Pirate ransoms in Somalia by attack date (De Groot et al 2011) 
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Figure 2: Ransoms paid in Nigeria 2006-2014 (Control Risks database) 
 
Figure 3: Ground floor underwriters’ room at Lloyd’s  (Lloyd’s 2015)  
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Table 1: Insurers, Underwriters and Crisis Responders 
Insurers  Underwriters Crisis Responder(s) 
ACE Lloyd’s Syndicate  2488 Red 24 
AIG American International Group   Neil Young Associates 
ANV  Lloyd’s Syndicates  779, 1861, 1969 
& 5820  
MS Risk 
AON (AON Benfield) Specialist insurer founded by Lloyd’s 
brokers 
Neil Young Associates 
Ascot Lloyd’s Syndicate 1414 MS Risk 
Aspen Lloyd’s Syndicate 4711 AKE, Aegis Response, 
Henderson Risk 
Beazley Furlonge Lloyd’s Syndicates 623, 2623, 3623, 
362 & 6107 
MAST 
Canopius Lloyd’s Syndicates 958 and 4444 “Supported by expert crisis 
consultants”50 
Chubb Lloyd’s Syndicate 1882 Ackermann 
CV Starr Lloyd’s Syndicate 1919 Neil Young Associates 
DUAL  Owned by Hyperion, a specialist 
insurer founded by Lloyd’s brokers 
and merged with several further 
Lloyd’s brokers. 
MS Risk 
Griffin Specialist insurer founded by Lloyd’s 
brokers 
Security Exchange 
Hiscox Lloyd’s Syndicate 33 Control Risks 
Houston Casualty Lloyd’s Syndicate 4141  Unity Resources 
Ironshore Lloyd’s Syndicates 4000 and 2014 Hazelwood 
Liberty Lloyd’s Syndicate 4472 Unity Resources 
Tokio Marine Kiln Lloyd’s Syndicates 510, 557, 1880 “In house” response team 
Travelers  Lloyd’s Syndicate 5000 Olive  
QBE Lloyd’s Syndicates 386 and 2999 Red 24 
XL Catlin (merged in 
2015) 
Lloyd’s Syndicate 2003 Terra Firma, Red 24, 
Compass Risk Management  
                                                             
50 http://www.canopius.com/what-we-do/political-risk-crisis-management/crisis-management/kidnap--
ransom/ 
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Appendix A: Interviews 
Interview I: Professional Ransom Negotiator interviewed in March 2012  
Interview II: Professional Ransom Negotiator interviewed in March 2012  
Interview III: Professional Ransom Negotiator interviewed in December 2014  
Interview IV: Professional Ransom Negotiator interviewed in January, February, May and 
June 2015  
Interview V: Professional Ransom Negotiator interviewed in March and May 2015  
Interview VI: Professional Ransom Negotiator interviewed in April 2015 
Interview VII: Attorney interviewed in March 2012  
Interview VIII: Attorney interviewed in April 2013  
Interview IX: FCO official interviewed in January 2015  
Interview X: Per Gullestrup, Former CEO, Clipper Shipping Group interviewed in January 
2015  
Interview XI:  Ship owner and piracy victim interviewed in February 2015  
Interview XII: Employee Crisis Response Company Interviewed February and March 2015  
Interview XIII: Employee Crisis Response Company Interviewed January 2015  
Interview XIV: Partner Crisis Response Company interviewed April 2013  
Interview XV: Family member of kidnap victim interviewed June 2013  
Interview XVI: Interview with insurance specialist. June 2015 
